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ABSTRACT
This article examines housing in the Soviet and post-Soviet era drawing from
interview material with fifty factory workers in St. Petersburg studied in 2000. While
the Soviet era is often characterised by lack of choice, I argue that people were in
fact able to influence their housing much more than is usually considered, although
the choices available were certainly limited and action was tactical rather than
strategic by nature (to borrow Michel de Certeau’s concepts). I argue that money
was far more important than is usually acknowledged, and many respondents
emphasised that they earned decent money and were able to purchase housing in the
Soviet era. Networks played a role too, for instance in attempts to influence the
authorities in charge of housing or to manipulate the rules of allocation. I also show
that various steps in the Soviet family’s life course (e.g. marrying or having a child)
were important in order to obtain housing. The post-Soviet era, in contrast, is
characterised by lack of money and few opportunities to improve housing. For many
respondents, then, it is the Soviet era that looks as an era that made action possible,
whereas the opportunities to act have now been severely reduced. This, and not just
pure nostalgia, explains why most respondents long for the Soviet times. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, housing became the first social policy area
scheduled for comprehensive reform (Cook, 2002: 110).1 The privatization
of the housing sector began in 1991 when the housing stock that had
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formerly belonged to the state was transferred to the municipalities, and
individual tenants obtained the right to privatize the flat they were
occupying free of charge (UNECE, 2004). Judging by the numbers, the
program was a success, since in 2004, approximately 70% of the housing
stock had been privatized, making Russia truly a “homeowners’ society”.
However, the intended deep structural transformation and reallocation of
financial responsibility were not achieved (Cook, 2002: 111). There were
two implicit assumptions behind the privatization, namely, that the new
owners would be both willing and able to manage and maintain the property
which they became owners of. It turned out, however, that neither was
realistic. Since privatization was free, ownership does not correlate with
income, and many new owners are financially unable to meet the rising costs
(UNECE 2004). Many Russians also have difficulty in thinking of housing as
a market commodity and continue to regard it as a right (Cook, 2002).
Thus, more than a decade after the transition in housing began, it has
become clear that it did not proceed as envisioned by Western advisors, but
followed a “path-dependent approach” in which “embedded institutions,
inherited norms and expectations have shaped the transition process” (Cook,
2002: 121). It is obvious that current attitudes, expectations and worries about
housing have not emerged out of the blue but have their roots in the Soviet past.
For this reason I will examine how the past looks from the present vantage
point as experienced by a group of ordinary Russians – factory workers in St.
Petersburg studied in 2000.2 My main interest are the parameters of action that
were available to so-called ordinary people, and I will examine whether the
Soviet past really was so devoid of choice as it is usually considered.3
40
2. My research is funded by the “Russia, Finland and globalization in a micro perspective”
research project, funded by the Academy of Finland and directed by Dr Markku Lonkila.
3. In general, housing as part and parcel of everyday life has been a largely neglected topic,
with some notable exceptions such as the magnificent studies of communal apartments by Boym
(1996), Gerasimova (1998; 2002) and Utekhin (2001), Paadam’s (2003) interesting study of
homeowners and their housing histories in Soviet-era and post-Soviet Estonia or Rotkirch’s
(2000) fascinating study, which details sexuality but is also illuminating reading for anyone
interested in housing. The bulk of research on housing centres on privatization and its problems
(Alexandrova, Hamilton, Kuznetsova, 2004; Bater, 1994; Cook, 2002; Kosareva, Puzanov,
Tikhomirova, 1996; Lee, Petrova, Shapiro, Struyk, 1998; Renaud, 1995a, 1995b; Struyk, 1996;
Struyk, Puzanov, Kolodeznikova, 2001, UNECE 2004) and new forms of social, economic and/or
residential stratification (Andrusz, Harloe, Szelenyi, 1996; Buckley, Gurenko 1997; Borén, 2003;
Gdaniec, 2001; Kulu, 2003; Lee, Struyk, 1996; Lehmann, Ruble, 2002; Ruble, 1995; Ruoppila,
2004; Trushchenko, 1995). 
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Briefly, the Soviet housing system had four distinctive features. First, the
housing market was limited, most housing being owned by the state. Second,
allocation of housing took place through waiting lists that belonged either to
municipalities or enterprises. The system was plagued by shortages and
waiting times were long, but once the residents finally got apartments, their
tenancy rights were very strong: occupancy was for life, flats could be passed
on by inheritance and eviction was virtually impossible. Third, rents were
stable and did not essentially rise after 1928. Fourth, the system was heavily
subsidized by the state, which meant that rents were nominal and comprised
only an insignificant portion of the family budget (Andrusz, 1990: 556;
Cook, 2002: 110). 
It would not then be difficult to see the system as one characterized by
lack of choice and passivity: in the absence of alternatives, citizens could only
sit and wait until allocated a flat, while after obtaining it, the flat was secure
almost no matter what people did or failed to do. The Latvian writer Pauls
Bankovskis recently claimed that the possibility of making choices is what
fundamentally distinguishes the post-Soviet era from the Soviet one: if
contemporary life enables, even compels choice-making, in the Soviet era
there was nothing to choose from, which made choice-making unnecessary
and life, in a sense, quite simple.4 While this may be taken as poetic licence, it
is, nonetheless, interesting that to find similar ideas in the scholarly context of
housing is not difficult. For instance, Lehmann and Ruble argue that
“[w]hereas once average citizens were largely at the whim of the enterprise
or municipal housing placement systems, today they have genuine housing
choices with respect to location, cost, size, amenities and neighbourhood”
(1997: 1086, emphasis added), or, in the provocative words of one Soviet
housing expert, the discretionary housing system was one which engendered
“infantilism, social apathy, inability to act and resignation” in the face of the
debauchery of bureaucrats (Bessonova as cited in Andrusz, 1990: 562). 
That Soviet citizens were clearly constrained in choosing and improving
housing is an indisputable fact. This does not, however, mean that they had no
choice at all or that action would have been impossible. Rather, the term
tactics used by Michel de Certeau (1984) nicely captures the parameters of
action in a given situation where although the rules are imposed from outside
and cannot be changed or rejected, they can be bent and manipulated. In this
article, after introducing the data used, I will first briefly sketch the Soviet
41
4. In Helsingin Sanomat 18th June 2005, p. C1.
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housing system deriving from Göran Therborn’s (1995) idea of social
steering, and then explain how tactical action relates to this concept. I will
then analyse the role of social networks as one important example of tactical
action and then proceed to another means –money– and its role in housing in
the Soviet era. I will then look at the respondents’ present housing situation
and consider social networks from another angle as threats to housing.
Although most respondents were housed as they were before the collapse of
the Soviet Union, there were also respondents who lived in worse housing
conditions or smaller flats than before. This was not caused by economic
difficulties per se, however, but changes in their family constitution. In the
Conclusions, I will discuss the possibility of action in the Soviet era in
contrast to contemporary Russia. 
DATA
The respondents in this study are factory workers from the Kirov tractor
factory in St. Petersburg, one of the most famous metalworking plants in the
Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. The data were provided by 50 workers
–38 men and 12 women– interviewed in one of the factory’s six departments
in winter 2000.5 Basic information for each respondent was obtained,
including age, occupation, work duties, marital status, length of residence in
St. Petersburg and their current flat, length of employment at the factory and
information on the members of the respondent’s household, his or her
parents and children. 
The respondents are typically middle-aged people in their forties and
fifties. A majority were either married (31 respondents) or cohabitating (two
respondents). Eight men and five women were divorced or widowed, and
four men had never been married. Many respondents –all female workers
and 28 male workers– had migrated to St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) from
other parts of the former USSR in the Soviet era (on the impact of
migration, see Lonkila and Salmi, 2005). In terms of housing, most
respondents, 26 men and six women, lived in separate or self-contained flats
(often, however, sharing it with parents or adult children – the term separate
flat simply denotes that it is not a communal one). Seven male and four
42
5. The data were collected in the course of the “Civic culture and nationality in North-West
Russia, Estonia and Finland” project, which was financed by the Academy of Finland and the
Universities of Helsinki and Joensuu, and led by Ilkka Liikanen from the Karelian Institute at
the University of Joensuu.
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female respondents lived in communal flats (flats with shared kitchen and
bathroom). Three men lived in a dormitory, and information about the
housing of four respondents was not known or remained unclear. Male
respondents more often lived in separate flats than did female respondents.
Two things probably explain this: less men than women were divorced and
ten men were originally born in Leningrad and had thus access to their
parents’ flats (only one native respondent lived in a communal flat). 
The data consist of two parts. Thematic interviews were conducted in order
to get a picture of the life course of the respondents depicting significant events
(place of birth and childhood, school, army service, changes in residence and
migration to Leningrad, work and marriage). Questions were then asked about
various themes: housing and living conditions, work, social relationships,
participation in social and political activities, leisure time, and worries and
expectations for the future. Since housing was one question only and not the
one that primarily interested the research group, the information available is
not as detailed in some cases as would ideally be the case, and many interesting
aspects of housing were not covered. For instance, no information exists about
the privatization of flats, which is maybe telling in itself, given that several
other housing-related topics unsolicited by the researchers, such as burdensome
relationships with communal neighbours, were discussed. 
A second data source consists of structured questionnaires containing
information about the workers’ personal networks. Networks were constructed
with the help of ten “name generators”, focusing on different forms of support
and sociability in daily life adapted from Claude Fischer’s (1982) network
survey (for further information, see Lonkila and Piipponen, 2000; Lonkila and
Salmi, 2005).6 In this article, however, the main emphasis is on the interviews.
The study is a qualitative one based on a small number of respondents among
43
6. The workers were asked with whom they talked about work (name generator 1),
whose opinion they would listen to when making an important decision (ng2), with whom they
shared a common hobby (ng3) or spent free time with (ng4), who could help them with
things such as repairing domestic appliances or fixing a car (ng5), who could offer them help in
baby-sitting or lend kitchen utensils (ng6), from whom they could borrow a large sum of money
(ng7), to or from whom they had given or received favours during the last three years (ng8), and
with whom they had participated together in meetings, demonstrations or strikes (ng9). To
complete this list, they were asked whether there were any important people who had not been
mentioned (ng10). The total list of names given by each respondent in reply to these name
generators constitutes his personal network. Detailed information was requested about each
network member mentioned, including age, occupation, place of birth and residence, type and
duration of relationship between respondent and network member and how they got acquainted.
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whom generalization in a statistical sense is not possible. Occasionally,
however, I have drawn on examples from other studies, which would suggest
that the phenomena I am describing are not limited to my respondents. Further
studies are obviously needed, especially to see how class, gender and migration
and their possible interconnections influence housing opportunities. 
SOVIET HOUSING: SOCIAL STEERING AND TACTICAL ACTION
Building socialism in Eastern Europe was, according to Göran Therborn
(1995), one of the world’s grandest attempts at social steering, “a concept
for designating attempts at deliberately directing social processes towards a
certain goal over a significant amount of time”. Using his ideas, I will sketch
Soviet housing as an example of social steering even at the risk of stretching
the concept too far. My point is not to investigate whether Soviet housing
really was social steering or not, but simply to use it as an illustrative device
so as to highlight certain important aspects of Soviet housing. 
To begin with, Therborn argues (1995) that social steering has two sets of
actors: the directors and the directed. In the case of Soviet housing, we can
discern political leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev, Brezhnev and
Gorbachev as directors with different housing policies. During Stalin’s time,
massive industrialisation was the first priority and investments were made in
heavy industry but not in housing for the population (including the millions
of peasants migrating to the cities who were needed for the purpose of
industrialisation). Khrushchev, on the other hand, launched a massive
building programme in the late 1950s, one of the largest government-
sponsored programs ever undertaken (Morton, 1980: 235; Buckley,
Gurenko, 1997: 21). The result was the infamous four- or five-floor
khrushchevki, which, as they were “poorly designed and shoddily built”, have
now become a serious social problem (Alexandrova, Hamilton, Kuznetsova,
2004: 117). Later, when construction technology improved, high-rise 10- and
12-storey buildings were built in the Brezhnev era, usually in remote
microraions far from the centre (Lehmann, Ruble, 1997: 1088; see, also,
Borén, 2003). One estimate is that two-thirds of the population were housed
between 1960 and 1975 (Bater, 1980: 102 in Lehmann, Ruble 1997: 1088). 
More generally, however, we can discern the “state” as an actor, because
the “total dominance of the state was the central attribute of the Soviet
housing system” with the state deciding on “how much and what type of
housing would be built, where it would be built …, who would build it, who
would occupy which units, and which organizations would maintain the
44
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housing once it was completed” (Struyk, 1996: 4).7 Those who were directed,
on the other hand, were in principle citizens of the USSR. In practice, the
“policy of government paternalism” was limited to urban dwellers, and the
rural population was more or less left to its own devices (Kosareva, Puzanov
and Tikhomirova, 1996: 264). Further limitations will be discussed below. 
Social steering requires four components (Therborn, 1995). The first is a
goal and goal-setting as a process. In housing, the official goal was equity or,
as guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, “fair allocation under public
control”.8 According to the law, the right to housing should be based on need,
not on financial status or the ability to pay (Alexeev, 1988a: 414). Cheap
housing was something the Soviet regime boasted about, and low rents were
used as testimony to the achievements of socialism (Andrusz, 1990: 565).
Indeed, it has been generally concluded that housing was far less stratified
than was generally the case in the west, even if income and privilege played a
far greater role than the Soviet leaders would ever have liked to admit (see,
Bater, 1994; Kulu, 2003; Morton, 1980; Ruoppila, 2004; Smith, 1996). 
Housing thus became a right that citizens could make claims on
(Therborn, 1995), an “entitlement for which public authorities bear
responsibility” (Cook, 2002: 112). A more practical goal was providing each
Soviet family with a separate flat. For instance, when Mikhail Gorbachev came
to power, he solemnly proclaimed the goal of “providing each family with a
separate apartment by the year 2000”9 (World Affairs, 1989: 100). 
The second component of social steering is the steering media “by which
means the goal of the directors is mediated to the directed” (Therborn, 1995:
334). In Soviet housing, the steering medium was political allocation through
the housing waiting list. Soviet citizens wanting to obtain housing could try to
get on a waiting list. These were of two basic types: municipal ones and those
45
7. There was much diversity within the socialist bloc in tenure patterns before the transition.
Some countries like Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia had home-ownership rates higher than the
United States, whereas the Soviet Union in general and the Soviet Republic of Russia in
particular were extremely state-dominated (Struyk, 1996: 9). 
8. Obviously this is very schematic and disregards variations in time as well as other goals
(such as the revolutionary housing ideas immediately after the revolution; see, Buchli, 2000).
Moreover, the reality was always much more complex. As Smith points out, although housing
was considered as every citizen’s right based on need, it was also treated as a privilege and
reward for certain categories, especially the elite (Smith, 1996: 80). 
9. Whether anybody believed him is another thing. People quickly turned the slogan “a flat
by the year 2000” into “a flat in 2000 years” (see, Huttunen, 1999: 263).   
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that belonged to enterprises or organizations (Morton, 1980: 239).10 Looking
at those who in practice were able to join waiting lists, however, the “citizen”
quickly fades away and other, narrower categories appear. In large cities such
as Leningrad or Moscow, joining the list was possible for those who had a
permanent propiska (right of residence)11 and needed more space. Need was
measured by so-called sanitary norms or number of square metres available
per person (exact square metre requirements varied regionally and in time,
but joining the list was usually not possible unless the per capita living space
was less than 3-7 square metres) (Morton, 1980Ø Gerasimova, 1998). More-
over, certain groups were preferred or were granted additional square metres
above the norm: for instance, “responsible workers”, a “deliberately vague
category” (consisting of, for example, those holding awards like Hero of the
Soviet Union or Hero of Socialist Labour), World War II invalids and the
families of those who died in the war, Leningrad siege survivors, tuberculosis
sufferers, those living in housing declared unfit for habitation, and so on and so
forth (Morton, 1980: 240-241). Moreover, Party members were given
preferential treatment on the housing waiting list; in fact acquiring a flat was
the biggest inducement the Party could offer (Ashwin, 1999: 132). 
The third component of social steering is implementation structures or
using the steering media to bring those directed to act in furtherance of the set
goal (Therborn 1995: 334). As for Soviet housing, we can distinguish the
administrative staff in housing committees and trade unions responsible for
municipal and enterprise housing administration. What is particularly relevant
is the nature of the system of provision. As pointed out by Sarah Ashwin, in
the context of analysing benefit allocation through the labour collective (which
includes but is not limited to housing), the system can be characterised as one
of state paternalism mediated through the labour collective, which had two key
features. First, it was monopolistic in character in that most goods and services
could not be acquired readily on the open market. In large cities, there was no
alternative to state housing. Moreover, “goods were not perks but
necessities”, housing being a perfect example of this. Second, the economy
46
10. According to Morton, enterprise waiting lists were preferred over municipal ones
because they were usually able to provide housing sooner. A “particularly skilful applicant”
was able to get on both or try the other if one refused (Morton, 1980: 239). Enterprise
housing was particularly important in Soviet Russia, accounting for 42% of all housing in 1991
(Struyk, 1996: 9). 
11. This resulted in a Soviet Catch-22, as described by Höjdestrand (2003), where a
propiska was a prerequisite for a job and a job for a propiska. For studies of how people
attempted to circumvent propiska regulations, see Buckley (1995), Wegren, Drury (2001).
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was always plagued by shortages and inadequacy which left space for
discretionary practices. Thus individual managers and members of the trade
union committee administering benefits possessed a potent means of control.
All this meant that those applying for benefits were compelled to cultivate
individual relationships with authorities. (Ashwin, 1999: 12). 
The fourth component of social steering is feedback mechanisms whereby
information about the outcome of implementation is relayed back to the
directors. Feedback, for many reasons, was something which was “always a
special problem for Communist regimes” (Therborn, 1995: 340). In housing,
the central means of feedback was through letters from the public. This was
something that leaders from Khrushchev onwards put great emphasis on,12
and tens of millions of letters were sent each year either to the authorities
directly or the media (White, 2002). The topics of these letters varied, but a
significant proportion concerned housing (Utekhin, 2004). 
Finally, social steering always takes place in a specific social context, in
which we should take into account “the ordinary strivings of the directed in
all their walks of life and their reactions to the steering efforts”; the reactions
of the external environment; and chance events (Therborn, 1995: 340). My
focus is on the first as I look at how the directed were or were not able to
influence their housing. Therborn’s idea that the directed are nonetheless
actors in my opinion comes close to Certeau’s idea of tactics. In his famous
book The practice of everyday life (1984), Certeau makes a distinction
between strategies and tactics. Strategies are able to “produce, tabulate and
impose spaces”, exemplified by the Spanish colonizers, who were able to
impose their own culture on the indigenous Indians. Tactics, on the other
hand, can only “use, manipulate, and divert these spaces” (Certeau, 1984: 30).
The Indians had no choice but to accept Spanish rule. However, they made of
the rituals something different to what the Spanish had in mind: “they
subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with
respect to ends and references foreign to the system they had no choice but to
accept” (Certeau, 1984: xiii, emphasis added). Soviet housing is a perfect
example of tactical action. In the absence of alternatives (the “market”) and
since it is a necessity and not a perk (Ashwin, 1999), housing was something
47
12. For instance, Gorbachev made frequent reference to letters from the public, sometimes
quoting them directly. On one occasion, when asked whether letters from ordinary people actually
reached him, he replied that they did and that “he tried to read as many of them as possible, and
took some home for further study” (White, 2002). Books and leaflets were also published
which taught people how to write complaints (Bogdanova, 2005). 
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that ordinary people could neither reject nor alter. This does not, however,
mean that they had no options at all. Instead, we can investigate whether they
actively used, manipulated and diverted the resources that were available. If
Therborn’s steering components are taken as a starting point, Soviet people
were certainly not able to influence the goal. The other components were,
however, much more open to use and manipulation: the steering media
(housing waiting lists), the implementation structures (the officials in charge)
and the feedback mechanisms (letter-writing). My argument is that networks
play a crucial part, in a way that I will detail shortly. 
So far it has been assumed that housing waiting-lists were the only means
of obtaining housing. But was the situation really so devoid of alternatives?
Yes and no. Building private houses was not an option: that was possible in
the countryside and small towns but prohibited in large cities with over
100,000 inhabitants (Alexeev, 1988b: 232). Another option was inheriting flats
(Roberts et al., 2003: 73); this, however, was dependent on registration rules
and was often accompanied by tactical use of them. No housing market in the
Western sense existed either. Scholars have, however, pointed out that there
was a shadow market in housing (Alexeev, 1988a; 1988b; Morton, 1980) so
that it was “subject to market and quasi-market intervention through the
robust unofficial economy” (Lehmann, Ruble, 1997: 1090; see, also, Paadam,
2003: 170, 279). Private rents and private flat exchanges existed, usually
involving money (Morton, 1980). Through these flat exchanges, people could
thus in a sense “purchase” and “sell” state-owned flats; and there are some
cases suggesting that money earned from the shadow economy was laundered
this way (Alexeev, 1988b). Money was, however, officially involved in co-
operative housing. This was not a genuine alternative either because it was
also based on the waiting list; relatively large inputs of money were, however,
demanded from the co-operative members (Andrusz, 2002). It is interesting
that many respondents mentioned money as an important means of obtaining
housing and this is a theme I will analyse after dealing with networks. 
NETWORKS AS MEANS OF OBTAINING HOUSING
If we are to follow Therborn’s components, then the first possible option of
using networks to obtain housing is through manipulating the implementation
structures; that is, officials in charge of housing distribution. As was already
mentioned, the provision system left much space for discretionary practices,
often forcing those applying for benefits to cultivate individual relationships
with the authorities (Ashwin, 1999: 12). In his 1980 analysis of housing,
48
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Morton described Soviet society as a “society of connections” where blat,13
bribes and pull made a difference in obtaining housing (Morton, 1980).
Another commentator on Soviet housing characterised housing allocation
system as one of “improprieties, corruption, and the preferential treatment of
certain customers” (Alexeev, 1988a: 414), while a third one called it influenced
by “ ‘subjective factors’ – that frequently used euphemism for corruption,
patronage and nepotism” (Andrusz, 1990: 556). Ledeneva (1998: 30-31)
describes housing as one common blat-usage context in which good
connections provided a flat in less time and often of better quality and in a
better location. A propiska or residence right in a big city was also often
obtained by semi-legal and illegal means, bribes for officials in passport offices
and individual influence often yielding the desired outcome (Buckley, 1995:
908). The scholarly conviction that various informal means were crucial is
perhaps best illustrated by Alexeev’s study with Soviet émigrés in which he felt
necessary to emphasise that, after all, “not all apartments are obtained with
the help of bribes and side-payments” (Alexeev, 1988a: 418, emphasis added). 
Although the evidence on the importance of connections seems
convincing enough, serious problems remain. Estimating the scope of these
practices is difficult, and it is also not clear who exactly (for instance, in class
terms) benefited most from networks. No overt cases of blat in housing were
found in the material with workers. While it is perfectly possible that this
reflects actual circumstances –perhaps the workers did not possess the
necessary connections or skills to improve their housing14– a more likely
explanation is that some people at least had used connections, but this is
simply not reflected in the material because of the typical misrecognition or
denial of blat described by Ledeneva (1998). It is also difficult to think of a
more explosive topic than the discretionary housing distribution practices in
the workplace. Thus, it is hardly surprising that references to blat were made
in the form of explicit denial, as did Yevgeny:15
49
13. Roughly meaning access to public resources through personal connections (see
Ledeneva, 1998).
14. Industrial workers (especially those working in the construction industry) were also
at an advantage compared to those working in light industry in that their industry provided
better housing (Kulu, 2003; Lehmann, Ruble, 1997; Paadam, 2003: 159), so that one possibility
still is that they were less in need. Judging by the large number of communal dwellers in the
material, this, however, does not seem credible.
15. All names used in the text are pseudonymous.
3. SALMI/2  27-06-07 13:44  Σελίδα 49
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 03:47:39 |
ANNA-MARIA SALMI
Yevgeny: At that time we got an increase [an additional family member was
born], our son was born in 1964. [So there we were:] me, my wife, our son and my
father-in-law. We got four rooms in a five-room flat, and they housed still another
person [in the fifth room]. 
Interviewer: How is it possible that you got so many rooms? Four rooms? Did
such things happen?
Yevgeny: Well, I don’t know. Not by blat, at least. It seems it just happened. 
Judging by how the majority of respondents lived, such things “just
happened” very rarely. That some people were more equal than others was
clear to those who had been less successful in obtaining housing. They were
often resentful and found their housing situation as insulting (obidno) (see,
also, Ashwin, 1999). One example is Gennady who as a young man had had
high hopes of obtaining housing. Having worked for more than 30 years
without “achieving anything except for two spinal hernias”, he was bitter. In
2000, he was still living in the same communal flat which he had obtained in
the early 1970s, although now he had two rooms instead of one at his disposal
after the neighbouring family had moved to a separate flat. These two rooms
he shared with his wife, daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter.16
A second possibility is tactical action in regard to the steering media, the
waiting list. The fact that the criteria were rather ambiguous made
manipulation possible. For instance, the category of “responsible workers”
left much scope for the employers to decide who was and who was not a
responsible worker. Examples of manipulating registration can be found in
the literature (although not usually conceived under the rubric of tactical
action). One common way was the manipulation of registration rules through
being registered in one flat and living elsewhere (e.g., Liborakina, Rotkirch,
1999; Platz, 2003: 119) or making all kinds of family arrangements, for
instance, caring for an elderly relative suffering a terminal illness in exchange
for a right to become an official resident of the relative’s flat and thus inherit
it (Rusinova, Brown, 1996: 20). The most extreme example comes from
Armenia, where aunts and uncles even legally adopted their siblings’ children
50
16. I have no material to deal with letter-writing, which is another attempt to
personalize relationships with authorities. Studies by Bogdanova (2005) and Utekhin
(2004) show, however, that ordinary people used letters in a tactical way, as individualized
means of seeking solutions to their housing problems.
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so as to give them inheritance rights to apartments during the Soviet era
(Platz, 2003: 119). 
The decision whether to register somebody in a given flat or not was often
crucial. In the case of a divorce, for instance, those who had not registered their
spouses could thank themselves as much as those who had registered could
blame themselves for doing so (as, for instance, Ilya, who will be introduced
later). Registration decisions also caused much strain in family relations.
Vladimir lived in a separate flat with his second wife Anna whom he had met
almost twenty years before. The couple had decided to register Anna’s son
Aleksey in the flat, but not his wife. “What if they divorce, then this will be just
like a communal flat”, Vladimir and Anna had thought, a decision that Aleksey,
however, was furious about and found difficult to accept. 
Networks were also crucial in making as much use as possible of the
category of “eligibles”. For instance, one is perhaps not a veteran of the Great
Patriotic War oneself, but an uncle is, and so on, and so forth. Vitaly’s
daughter Irina lived with her daughter and second husband in Vitaly’s three-
room flat, but was still registered with her first husband: 
Vitaly: My daughter’s queuing [in the housing waiting list]. She’s registered at her
first husband’s. His mother was a blokadnitsa [siege survivor], so things looked
bright. Now they’ve buried her, so nothing looks bright any more. 
These practices have clearly not vanished in the post-Soviet era. When
the privatization of flats began, many Russian families temporarily
registered their elderly relatives from the countryside in their city
apartments, because households with veterans would be allowed more space
and cheaper rates for privatisation (they then returned the relatives to the
countryside when the procedure was over) (Lehmann and Ruble, 1997: 1098-
1099). Manipulating registration was also one means of coping with the
1998 financial crisis. One family in Liborakina and Rotkirch’s study, for
instance, had arranged things so that an elderly father, a war veteran, got a
fictitious divorce from his wife in order to get registered in his daughter’s
flat. Now the household consisted of one “veteran of the Great Patriotic War
and warrior-internationalists” (the father) and one “mother of a large
family” (the daughter) which made it possible to stay on the waiting list and
also helped to reduce housing costs (Liborakina and Rotkirch, 1999: 36). 
Besides fictitious divorces, other not uncommon examples of tactical
action are engaging in fictitious marriages so as to obtain housing, or in
making an “additional” child (Rotkirch, 2000; see, also, Buckley, 1995;
51
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Morton, 1980: 250; Platz, 2003: 119). These manipulate the central principle
of Soviet housing allocation, namely the amount of space available per
person: as flats rarely shrank, the only logical way to affect this people-per-
square-metre ratio was to increase the number of people.17 My point is now,
however, that regardless of whether babies were made or marriages
established with or without this intention, family arrangements had important
consequences for “ordinary people’s” housing and thus, in a sense, became
tactical. In Lehmann and Ruble’s formulation, the state “established the
incentives to which individuals responded” which led to “unusually early
marriage and childbearing” (1997: 1103). A family was usually a necessary
although not always a sufficient criterion. This means that, other things being
equal, without a family the chances of improving one’s housing were slight, as
exemplified by those respondents who had never been married. Andrei, a
worker in his mid-forties, still lived in the same dormitory where he had lived
since coming to Leningrad in 1974. Actually he had improved his housing, but
only “within the dorm”, as he put it. Having changed rooms five times, he had
obtained one of the quietest rooms in the dormitory, but moving beyond the
dormitory was beyond his means. Likewise, the unmarried worker Boris had
been living in the factory’s dormitory since 1978. The other unmarried
respondents were young boys, all living with their parent(s).18
Marriage thus improved one’s chances of housing, as Anna Rotkirch
(2000) shows. When looking back at our respondents’ housing histories,
estimating the impact of marriage alone is difficult because a child usually
appeared very soon after marriage (sometimes marriage was prompted by
it).19 Thus, marriage and childbirth was usually a step ahead in one’s housing
52
17. Also illustrated in jokes: “A couple with nine children are living in a small communal
flat. Along comes Brezhnev’s decree that families with ten children must be given big new
flats. So the wife says to the husband, ‘Listen, you must have got an illegitimate son
somewhere in Siberia. Get on a plane and go and find him and then we’ll finally be able to get
a new flat’. So the husband sets off for Siberia, collects his illegitimate son and two days later
gets back home with him. But the wife is sitting all on her own and all the children have
disappeared. ‘What’s happened? Where are the children?’ ‘Oh,’ the wife says, ‘it’s been a
complete invasion. All the children’s fathers turned up to collect them to take advantage of
this decree!’.” (in Lissyutkina, 1999: 183).
18. One illustration of the poor housing situation of single households in the Soviet Union
is that, according to statistics from the late 1980s, a quarter lived in hostels or private
accommodation (Andrusz, 1990: 556). 
19. A Soviet marriage implied children: For most people having one child soon after the
wedding “was an unquestioned, almost automatic expectation. Postponing it for social or
professional reasons was unusual and considered selfish; infertility was seen as a tragedy and
often a social taboo” (Rotkirch, 2000: 79).
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career: this was particularly crucial for the migrant respondents since it meant
moving from the dormitory to a communal flat. If no children appeared, this
usually meant that the chances of improvement were slight. Viktor was a
worker in his mid-forties and a native-born leningradets who lived with his
wife in a one-room flat, which his mother, a blokadnitsa, had obtained in the
1970s. Viktor was married but without children, since his wife had had a
miscarriage and was unable to have children. What was a personal tragedy for
the couple had also consequences for their housing: he was still living in the
same one-room flat with his wife in 2000 “because of the square metres”, as he
noted. Having just half a square metre above the norm, he had never been able
to join the housing waiting list. Without making explicit reference to his own
family situation, he certainly was aware of it in noting that many people got
flats from the factory when their families became bigger, when “their children
married, grandchildren appeared and again there’s not enough space”. 
Children thus provided a realistic opportunity for housing improvement.
For the majority, however, it took some time:20
Zinaida was married in 1971 while still living in the factory’s dormitory. Later, the
couple rented a room (privately), and then received a room in a communal flat.
Their children were born in 1976 and 1983. After having saved money and waiting
in the queue for a co-operative flat for eight years, they moved into a three-room
co-operative flat in 1988. 
Leonid was married in 1975 while living in the factory’s dormitory, but as his wife
was pregnant and expected to give birth in a few weeks, they got a room in a
communal flat where the baby was born. Two years later, their second child was
born, after which the family received two rooms in another communal flat, where
they have been living since 1977. In 1995, their neighbours moved away and
Leonid’s family got their room as well; hence they had a separate three-room flat at
the time of the study. 
Ivan was married in 1972 while living in the factory’s dormitory. He moved into
his wife’s dormitory room, where they lived when their son was born the same
year. Next year, they got a 18 m2 communal room from the Kirov factory. Their
twins were born in 1980, and in 1981 they got a separate three-room flat. 
53
20. Andrusz (1990: 555) gives an interesting list of waiting times for several Soviet cities. In
1987, a citizen in Minsk who had joined the housing waiting lists in 1976 could at least expect to
get an offer of accommodation. But if waiting in Minsk took about 11 years, in Voroshilovgrad
(now Luhansk in Ukraine) it took 13-15 years, Dushanbe 14-18 years and Irkutsk 26-28 years!
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All three were thus able to move from the communal flat by getting a
separate flat from the factory or the city (Ivan), building a co-operative flat
(Zinaida) or getting the whole communal flat for themselves after their
neighbours moved out (Leonid). Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, those
respondents who had separate three-room flats were very satisfied with their
housing. The reverse was true for those who still lived communally in 2000. It
seems that networks were taken as reference points when people evaluated
their housing situation, in that they compared their own housing situation to
other people they knew (rather than to the new rich or the West, although
this should be read with caution since there is not enough material to clarify
this aspect). A survey conducted in the Soviet era suggested that those who
were most dissatisfied with their housing were those who had observed close
relatives and friends obtain flats while not being assigned flats themselves
(Morton, 1980: 236). Gerasimova has pointed out that the communal flats
were the norm for a long time, and it is only from the 1960s onwards –when a
separate flat became a real and accessible alternative– that communal
apartments became “really horrid” (sovsem uzhasnye) (1998: 240). 
MONEY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NETWORKS? 
If networks often made a difference in housing, broad consensus exists about
networks being vital in virtually all other aspects of everyday life under
socialism as well (Ledeneva, 1998; Lonkila, 1999; Morton, 1980; Srubar, 1991;
Wedel, 1986). Because Soviet-type economies were characterized by endemic
shortages, money was a necessary but not sufficient medium of exchange
(Srubar, 1991) or was relatively unimportant and “did not function as the main
element in economic transactions” (Ledeneva, 1998: 34-35). Money, for
obvious reasons (shortage being one of them), certainly mattered less than in
market economies; many things could not be bought and “access” was far more
important. While the role of money should not be overestimated, it should not
be underestimated either (Gerasimova, 2003; see, also Pine, 2002 for an
illustrative account of money during socialist-era Poland). It is, at least, quite
interesting that the workers talked much less about networks than they did about
money in the Soviet era. A recurrent theme was talking about one’s salary: 
Grigory recalled a former job of his where he began working in the mid-
1970s:
You know, it was just splendid to work there. In those days I earned 450 roubles
[a month]. 
54
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Zinaida, a respondent already mentioned, had “a very good salary” in the
Soviet era: 
The salary was 300 roubles. That was sufficient, that was very good, we saved
[money], bought our first car – now we already have our third. We saved money
for a flat, for a garage…” It’s just so fortunate, buying such a great three-room
flat now would hardly be possible. 
Many others, too, talked of being able to buy furniture and other items
(actually using the verb kupit’, buy), as did Nina and Yuri:
Nina: Well, I think about ten years ago we perhaps earned slightly less, but we
were able to live with that money. Everything that we bought for our home,
furniture and the rest, everything was bought in those days. Now we would need to
change all the furniture, but there’s no money to do that, to change a cupboard or
a sofa. Everything was bought in those days. I think we lived better before. 
Yuri: Now you see how much we were able to earn, how much we earned.
[Money] to live with, I could afford to drink once in a while. Everything, it was
enough for everything… I was able to buy furniture right after I had moved [to a
co-operative flat]. 
Whether the Soviet era really was a land of abundance is another matter.
Scarcity and queues were mentioned very seldom, and it would certainly be
easy to argue that the respondents take the excess of money from socialism
and the availability of goods from post-socialism and make a nice nostalgic
combination of it.21 Two things are worth pointing out, however. The first is
a very obvious one: whether the Soviet era was one of abundance or not is
irrelevant. What is relevant in understanding current attitudes to housing is
that it looks like one now, an era full of opportunities to earn money and
buy things. However, there was also something to suggest that the
respondents had in the Soviet era acted as if money was relevant. Some
respondents, for instance, had changed jobs for better-paid ones, either
within the factory or changing workplaces altogether. Some also mentioned
55
21. While the economy was always plagued by shortages, the perestroika period in particular
accelerated the problem since household money incomes rose by 50% in five years, unmatched
by an increased supply of consumables. This resulted in the accumulation of savings, which were
then destroyed by inflation which had been largely suppressed until 1991 (Clarke, 2002: 2).
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having worked long shifts and weekends that gave an opportunity to earn
“decent sums of money for those days”, as mentioned by Vadim.
Gerasimova (2003) points out that Soviet people tried to increase their
monetary incomes in a number of ways, including moonlighting and having
a khaltura (extra job for extra money), working in building brigades during
summer times, or working in the Northern parts of the USSR where salaries
were higher. Why do so if money really was so unimportant?
Housing is a primary case illustrating that money did matter.
Unofficially, money was involved in flat exchanges, private rents and bribing
officials (Morton, 1980; see, also, Paadam, 2003). Interestingly enough, it
was officially involved in co-operative housing as well. Currently at least six
respondents were living in co-operative flats and some others had previously
lived in them (before divorce). These respondents talked a lot about their
salaries and saving for flats. Grigory, the worker mentioned above, started
saving for one in the mid-1970s. 
Grigory: I still remember it, the first deposit [for the co-operative] was 2300 [roubles].
A lot of money in those days. Well, a two-room flat. That’s how things were. 
Interviewer: You could afford it in those days, could you?
Grigory: Well, certainly, what do you think! Four hundred and fifty roubles [his
salary at the time] – those days we flew to the south every year. And now, just to
send the child to a summer camp or somewhere [is difficult] …
The co-operative system existed between 1924 and 1937 and was revived
in the early 1960s (Andrusz, 2002: 135). The tenants paid an initial deposit and
monthly payments that were higher than rents for state apartments (Smith,
1996: 79). One estimate is that payments were three to five times greater than
those in state accommodation, although the system was heavily subsidized by
the state (Andrusz, 2002: 135). Money was never sufficient as such because the
right to subscribe to a co-operative was based on need (e.g. sanitary norms).22
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22. The fact that money was involved made the issue ideologically laden and many local
authorities “were socially and ideologically biased against the tenure” and feared that this
resulted in queue jumping (Andrusz, 2002: 135). Co-operative housing was usually built to higher
standards than state housing, and was an important source of qualitative differentiation under
socialism (Smith, 1996: 79).
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Nonetheless, the way many respondents talked about saving was perhaps not
dramatically different from the way workers in Western countries might talk
about their housing. Ilya, for instance, had saved for and bought a one-room
co-operative flat in the 1980s. He recalled that after purchasing it he had debts
and started constantly to think about how to be able to earn sufficient money.
Mikhail talked of how he first wanted to find a job, then to earn money and
then invest in a flat: “then I could eventually allow myself to marry”. 
Money figured in less successful stories as well. Andrei, the unmarried
worker still living in the dormitory, had queued for a co-operative flat. This
never worked out, however, since after the collapse of the Soviet Union the
prices had risen beyond his means. He had had money, but perestroika had
destroyed it all, he sighed. The saddest example, however, is Oleg, a worker
who still lived in bad housing conditions in 2000, having one 11m2 communal
room which he shared with his wife and their 22-year-old daughter.
Moreover, the room was of the worst kind, having an entrance only through
their neighbours’ room. The first thing Oleg regretted about his
accommodation was that at some point he had been offered a better, larger
room. He had, however, refused to take it because, afraid of being removed
from the housing list (that is, because he then would have had more square
metres at his disposal than before), he did not want to spoil his chances of
getting a separate flat. His decision was by no means exceptional. According
to Vysokovskii (2001a: 167), some people refused housing improvements or
even worsened their housing conditions in order to improve their chances of
going up in the housing waiting list. But there was more regret in Oleg’s
account: his personal history was one of constant saving, first saving for a
motorcycle but not buying one so as to save for a car, which he did not buy
so as to invest in a cooperative flat, which he did not finally do, because his
wife’s sister got a flat “for free” and thus, he had thought, “why would I put
my money into a co-operative when I can have a flat [for free] in six or seven
years?” The saddest thing is that apart from never getting a flat he lost all the
money to inflation as well.
What went wrong in his calculations we all know: the USSR collapsed.
The end of “free” housing meant that finally reaching the top of the waiting
list accounted for nothing. Ashwin notes that in Vishnovka, the end of “free”
housing in 1996 was a major scandal in the mining community. People felt it
was extremely unjust that had they reached the top of the waiting list one
year before, they would have obtained housing for nothing, whereas they
now had to pay millions to get one (Ashwin, 1999: 41). That a whole
political system collapses is beyond any worker’s control, but what makes
57
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things more complicated for them is that when they look back, their housing
history might also appear as one of making the wrong decisions (as they can
now, in retrospect, conclude); in other words, it looks like individual not
systemic failure. 
Money was the central feature characterizing the post-Soviet situation as
well. Now it appeared, however, in a negative light. Money was now
“demanded everywhere”, but was in acute shortage. Zinaida contrasted a
good income in the Soviet era with an insufficient salary now, which was her
biggest worry (although she had actually benefited greatly from inflation,
which had made it easy to pay for her co-operative flat): 
I’m worried, as probably everybody else is [about their salary]. People need
normal salaries, stable work, so that they needn’t worry all the time… This is the
main problem: money, money, money. Material circumstances in general… The
problem is that they pay very little, 2500 [roubles]; I think it’s very little. I have a
three-room flat – I pay 301 roubles just for the flat, plus 60 [roubles] for the
telephone, plus lighting, that’s already almost 500 roubles, [it’s the same sum] as
our avans [advance of salary]. They pay an avans of 500 roubles. That’s very little. 
The monthly income of Zinaida’s family was in the highest range (4500
roubles or more a month, about USD160 at the time), meaning that the
proportion spent on housing was 11% or less. This is moderate by western
standards but certainly much higher than rents in the Soviet era, which
averaged 3% in the early 1990s (UNECE, 2004). Most respondents were
deeply dissatisfied with their salaries: “what we get doesn’t even count as
money”, complained Yuri, summing up the sentiments of many. Ironically
enough, the only consolation was that the salaries were at least paid on time
(an improvement compared to the situation a few years back) and certainly
better than future pensions, which were miserable.  
That money was needed in housing was generally agreed upon. Dwellers
in separate apartments could congratulate themselves on having “managed”
to build a flat “at the last moment” (uspel postroit’), “when the prices were
still affordable”, as had Denis who had bought a co-operative in 1993
(references to good timing were also found in a study by Shurygina, 1998:
237). Those who had not been so fortunate concluded that buying flats was
now impossible. Nina, who was mentioned before, lived in very difficult
circumstances: her communal neighbour was violent and had actually hit her
once. Nina was very distressed about the situation and dreamt of a separate
flat, which was beyond her means, however: 
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There are no possibilities, there’s no money. If only there was money, then a
change of flats could be made. Five thousand dollars would be needed to change
these two rooms into a two-room flat, but where would this money come from?
There’s no money. 
Without money it would only be possible to change the two rooms into
rooms in another communal flat, something Nina deemed senseless. Having
lost all her savings in the August 1998 crisis (an event she mentioned as one
that had changed her attitude to life) the only option was starting saving
again; not an easy task, however, with household incomes less than 2500
roubles (about 90 dollars) a month. “Economizing”, “saving every penny”
and “not buying anything for myself” were the means through which she
hoped one day her wish for a separate flat would be realized. 
NETWORKS AS THREATS TO HOUSING? 
Our respondents were worried in general about the instability of the present
and uncertainty about the future. The transition has caused many well-
known problems to so-called ordinary Russians: a dramatic decline in living
standards; falling wages and social benefits; unemployment, lay-offs and
non-payments of wages, etc. (see, Clarke, 2002: 1-9). Logically, one would
expect this also to be reflected in the way people are housed but, as Cook
points out, despite a severe decline in Russia’s GDP, productivity and
incomes, most Russians were housed as before whether or not they could
pay (2002: 112-113). There is evidence to suggest that housing was in effect
used as a shock absorber: when so much else was changing, housing was
explicitly kept as a secure aspect of people’s lives (Struyk, 1996: 55-57). For
instance, eviction has been rarely used and the housing sector is still heavily
subsidised by municipalities and enterprises (Cook, 2002: 112-113). For
individual dwellers this meant that expenditure on housing was still relatively
small – in October 2001 6,5% of average income, still negligible although
considerably higher than in the early 1990s (when it was less than 3%).23 The
problem is that while households pay only 20-40% of their housing costs,
most is paid by the municipalities but at least 20% of all costs go unpaid.
This leads to collapsing properties and infrastructure, wastage of resources,
increasing debts and a range of other problems (UNECE, 2004).
59
23. According to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2002, as cited in UNECE
(2004).
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In 2000 most of our respondents, too, were housed as they were before
the collapse of the Soviet Union – some of them had even obtained a better
flat in the early 1990s (usually co-operative flats that had been finished in the
early 1990s). There were, however, also respondents who lived in smaller
flats than they had before the transition. This was not caused by economic
difficulties due to the transition, however, but what could be called changes in
their family constitution. The first such threat is when a relationship breaks
up, i.e., divorce. Ilya had saved for and bought a co-operative flat during the
Soviet era. It had only one room and a kitchen but was otherwise “ideal”: 
A 20 m2 room, kitchen – 10m2, balcony – 7m2, sixth floor, windows facing south. 
A very good flat. I was very sad when I got divorced. … We lived there in this one-
room flat, I registered her [his wife] there, and that’s it. Thirteen years went by: 
we separated and arranged an exchange of flats. Now I live in a communal flat.
The communal flat where he had lived since 1997 was a despised
“khruschevka”.24 Many respondents living in communal flats were divorcees,
and this is no coincidence. A divorce always had an effect for housing, and, as
Anna Rotkirch points out, in the socialist era “the apartment question” (but,
she claims, not money in itself)25 was a factor for married couples in deciding
whether to separate or not (Rotkirch, 2000: 94). Rotkirch argues that as
apartments were among the hardest things to get, it was usually the men who
were at greatest risk: a divorced man “usually returned to live with his
parents or found a new wife” (Rotkirch, 2000: 94; see, also, Borneman, 1992
for similar patterns in East Berlin). Here one should note, however, that for
the migrants (a significant proportion of Leningrad residents and our
respondents likewise), the first option never existed. Not even the most
60
24. The respondents who lived in communal apartments lived as a rule in remote workers’
districts such as Kirovskii or Krasnoselskii raion, i.e., in houses constructed in the 1960s and
later. If many communal flats in the city centre have attracted the newly wealthy, the workers
living in the “outskirts” are disadvantaged both by location and period of housing construction
(Alexandrova, Hamilton, Kuznetsova, 2004; see, also, Gdaniec, 2001).  
25. While money was perhaps not decisive, there is in fact a lot to suggest that it played a
role nonetheless. For instance, in Rotkirch’s material a woman called Elena had a first
husband who in order to “be able to buy an apartment … went working as a sailor for two
years” after which he had “earned enough money to buy a so-called co-operative apartment in
1970”. After divorcing him, “Elena got rid of her husband by buying him out of the apartment
he had earned at sea” with money provided by her second husband’s mother. After divorcing
him, too, Elena “gathered enough money –this time her own– to buy a second apartment”
(Rotkirch, 2000: 81-82, emphasis added).
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desperate divorcee would ever have considered returning to the countryside,
having once obtained the right of residence in Leningrad. 
Two more options were usually available. One was switching flats, as Ilya did
– a practice already existing in the Soviet era although changes were often very
complicated and usually involved money (Morton, 1980: 242-7). One more
“possibility”, the worst one, was the “classic, embarrassing and cruel situation”
where the couple remained living together in the same flat after the divorce,
possibly together with new partners (Rotkirch, 2000: 81). What is important to
note is that these “options” have not been outdated by post-socialism. Igor was
bitter. Having acquired a three-room flat in 1993, his “wife divorced him” the
year after. In 2000, Igor still lived there, “in a three-room flat where I occupy
one room only”, as he put it with sarcasm in his voice. The situation with his ex-
wife was tense and Igor accused her, among other things, of trying to force him
to leave, which he refused to do. Having married people who live separately and
divorced people who live together (Castrén, 2001: 79) is by no means
exceptional in post-Soviet Russia (see, also, Piirainen, 1997: 194-195).
If a divorce usually means that a “Soviet success story” of a three-room
flat is ruined, another threat exists as well. This also has to do with networks,
now with enlarging ones. One’s children grow up, marry and have families of
their own, but have nowhere to live and thus have to remain at their parents’
place with in-laws moving in. In 2000, Mikhail had a separate co-operative
flat where he lived with his wife and two adult children. He was satisfied with
his housing, but added the words “so far”: as long as the children (aged 21 and
19) are unmarried. Irina and her family had obtained two rooms in a
communal flat from the factory in 1971. Later their communal neighbours
moved away and they got the third room, so that they had a separate three-
room flat. But in 2000, Irina, now a widow, complained, “This is a communal
flat again! Our daughter got married and lives here with the son-in-law; our
son got married, [they] also live here.” Now there are seven people (including
two in-laws) and three generations living in her “separate” three-room flat.
Chronic housing shortages made this a familiar pattern in the Soviet era
too26 but now the housing waiting list does not provide flats and the market is
61
26. According to one Soviet-era survey from Kiev in 1975 (cited in Morton 1980: 257),
only 5-6% of newly-weds moved into their own flat.
27. A completely contrary view is presented by Roberts et al., who argue that the reforms
have not made it more difficult for young people to obtain their own places. On the contrary,
“the chances must have improved”, they reason, “due to the rise in mortality and the decline in
the marriage rates that would have reduced the number of actual and potential households.
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a solution only for a few.27 Inheriting a flat – another typical means of getting
a flat in the Soviet era (Roberts et al., 2003: 73) – is again quite unlikely
particularly for the migrant respondents. The migrants in our material are
usually married to another migrant (Lonkila, Salmi, 2005) and thus their
children have no hope of inheriting the flat of their grandparents, which
makes these migrants’ position very vulnerable. The children may, of course,
marry someone with a flat, but even when some managed to do so this
usually did not solve the problem for the parents if they had more than one
child, since it was unlikely that both or all children were able to move out. 
Some respondents had made big sacrifices to obtain a flat for their
children (see, also, Burawoy, Krotov, Lytkina, 2000).28 Arkady had lived in a
communal flat in the 1980s together with his wife, their daughter, her husband
and their child. When Arkady’s daughter gave birth to twins, housing
opportunities looked bright, because they were supposed to have a separate
flat in six months. That actually happened, but Arkady was given a choice: the
whole extended family could either have a separate five-room flat or the
young couple could have a three-room flat, whereas Arkady and his wife
would still be waiting for a one-room flat. They decided on the latter option,
not wanting to “disturb the life of the young ones”. In 2000, however, Arkady
was still living in the communal flat in a 15m2 room, sharing it with his wife,
who had become a former one. Another example is Fedor who got a two-
room flat with family in 1971. When his only son grew up, they changed their
two-room flat into a one-room flat for Fedor and his wife, and a room in a
communal flat for their son. For many respondents, then, the situation was
thus one where either a larger flat had to be changed for a smaller one (flats
or rooms), or else the children (with their spouses) remained living at their
parents’ flat. Both variants destroy the dream of the precious “separate three-
room flat”, even for those who once were lucky to have one. In 2000, the
62
Pressure on the housing stocks would therefore have eased” (Roberts ,et al., 2003: 83). While
this may have some impact, it is hard to follow their logic fully, since most housing stock now
has owners (flats either being privatized already or can be privatised in the future), and it is hard
to see how to claim ownership of property if one has no means to purchase or rent a flat, and
will not inherit one. As has been pointed out, cheap rents in the Soviet era gave no incentives
for “empty nesters” to move into smaller units (Struyk, 1996: 54; see, also, Kulu, 2003: 908).
Even after the transition, rents are relatively cheap and vacant flats are rather kept as a good
investment instead of being sold (Struyk, 1996: 2, 54).
28. In the republic of Komi, some pensioners had migrated permanently to the village or
to the dacha so as to leave their town apartment to their children (Burawoy, Krotov, Lytkina,
2000: 63, endnote 9).
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declaration by Gorbachev about a separate apartment by that year was true
only for some respondents. Although more than half (thirty-two respondents)
had a separate (self-contained) flat, only a third of them (eleven respondents)
lived in this separate flat either alone, with their spouse and/or with children
under 18. Others shared the flat with adult children, in-laws, grandchildren,
parents, parents-in-law, siblings or ex-spouses. 
Although these problems have not been directly caused by the transition
(in that they are not caused by economic difficulties per se), obviously they
can be derived from the transition in that the housing waiting list had ceased
to offer a solution. Still, from the respondents’ viewpoint the situation looks
–and in a sense, is– like one where housing is affected by their (kin)
networks rather than the system, where various “ifs” about their networks
determine the future: we have a three-room flat and that will be secured if we
don’t divorce, if the children don’t marry, if they marry somebody with a
flat, if aunt Ira dies and leaves a flat, if… A study of homeless people in St.
Petersburg by Höjdestrand interestingly suggests that this kind of argument
may be widespread: kin or the lack of it, not the state or the improperly
working system, was most often seen as the real reason behind homelessness
(Höjdestrand, 2003, 2005). 
CONCLUSIONS
Housing and networks are connected in many ways. Inspired by Certeau’s
(1984) ideas, I have analysed networks as tactical action, that is, action that
takes place within certain rules imposed from outside and which cannot be
changed or rejected but can be bent and manipulated. We can distinguish
between two ways of using networks in order to obtain or improve housing.
The first is the attempt to influence the officials in charge, that is, to
personalize impersonal bureaucratic relationships or plead with the
authorities (to use Therborn’s terms, actors are using implementation
structures or feedback mechanisms in a tactical way). The second is when not
the people in charge but the rules of allocation (or the steering media in
Therborn’s terms) are used tactically with the help of networks, manipulating
registration and the categories of “eligibles” being perfect examples of this.
Moreover, as the basic rule for allocating flats was the amount of space per
person, to increase the number of persons in a given space was a crucial
means of manipulating this ratio; decisions on whether to marry or not, have
a child or not, divorce or not making a difference in this respect. As Anna
Rotkirch has convincingly shown, each step in the Soviet family’s life course
63
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–from dating to marrying, having a child, divorcing, marrying again– was
usually both influenced by and had implications for housing (see, Rotkirch,
2000). Lehmann claims that having children was one of the few ways Soviet
people could improve their chances of obtaining new housing in the Soviet
era (Lehmann, 1992, cited in Lehmann, Ruble, 1997: 1093). 
This article has sought to show that although having children was central,
theoretically speaking at least far more options of using one’s network were
available. How much workers were actually able to draw on their networks
(vis-à-vis other socio-economic groups) is a question that nonetheless
remains open. Research on housing distribution from Russia (Rusinova,
Brown, 1996), Estonia (Kulu, 2003) and Hungary (Bodnar, Böröcz, 1998)
suggest that in fact people with higher education were better connected and
had better access to housing advantages, although many other factors also
played a role (e.g. the era when family and working life began, occupation,
age, employment sector, place of origin [i.e., whether migrated or not] and
ethnic origin) (Kulu, 2003). It is perhaps, then, not just a coincidence that
many worker respondents, just like the unskilled respondents in the study by
Rusinova and Brown (1996), emphasised the role of money in the Soviet era
rather than that of networks. Co-operative builders particularly recounted
how they were able to earn, spend and save money during the Soviet era.
The role of money has been seen as minor in the context of socialist
shortage economies (e.g., Ledeneva, 1998; Srubar, 1991), but housing serves
as a good case to show that the division between a supposedly non-monetary
Soviet era and monetary post-Soviet era is in fact a blurred one. 
Although the focus in this article has been on networks and money, it is
apparent that not everybody was equally capable of using them. Alexis
Berelowitch has characterised the 1970s as an era mixed with paternalistic
expectations from the state and attempts to “take from the state what it was
supposed to but could not provide –by legal means if possible and by illegal
means if not” (2004: 30). If most respondents were prone to both expect and
take, it is obvious that some were able to take more and expect less, whereas
others took less and expected more– often in vain. The ambivalence is
nicely illustrated by Oleg who saved and saved for a flat but then eventually
decided not to buy one since his expectation was to get a flat for free just in
a few years. Although the parameters of action should not be exaggerated,
what seems important to me is that when the transition is considered, for
almost all respondents the opportunities to act (whether using networks or
money or both) to improve or obtain housing have now been severely
reduced. If money is taken as an example, the situation is paradoxical. What
64
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we have on the one hand is active home savers in the Soviet era that was
supposedly non-monetary and characterised as one of stagnation. On the
other hand, we have a supposedly monetary post-Soviet era where money is
acutely needed everywhere but is desperately short, and the prospects for
housing improvements are bleak. Purchasing a flat is beyond the means of
the workers, and no properly functioning loan market system exists, at least
for the time being (UNECE, 2004). The transition wiped away most former,
“Soviet” values; and if it introduced anything new, it was the promise of the
“market”, that is, of housing as a commodity that can be bought and sold.
Given the financial constraints, the transition, ironically enough, not only
left this promise unrealised but abolished opportunities for many
respondents to buy or improve housing.
According to several recent surveys, most ordinary Russians think that
Russian life was at its best under Leonid Brezhnev, an era characterised by
stability (Dubin, 2004). When the workers grumble and complain about
present conditions and long for the Soviet past –as most workers in our
material do– it is just too simplistic to label this pure nostalgia.29 Rather, an
enquiry into their housing histories suggests that they long for an era that
made action possible, even if the opportunities for action may seem limited
from a Western standpoint. The respondents, being fully aware of a range of
Soviet hardships (having experienced them themselves), nonetheless long for
a more “normal life” in a more “normal society”, as the Russian standard
expressions go, where “everybody who wants to work can find a job”, where
“if you save money, it does not lose its value because of inflation”, or where
“there are opportunities for you and your children to improve your living
conditions”. These quotes are not from the material (though they sum up the
sentiments nicely) but are what were given in a recent survey as the most
popular answers to the question of what constitutes a “normal society”.30 In
the same survey, more than 70% thought that Russia was not a “normal
65
29. In Ashwin’s Vishnovka, for instance, the mine was no longer able to provide a social
safety net, and savings had been destroyed by inflation. Wages were not paid in time, holiday
and sick pay were not paid automatically, unemployment was threatening, and all kindergartens
were under the threat of closure. Ashwin (1999: 63) concludes that “the pervasive sense of
insecurity and loss of community in Vishnovka therefore cannot be reduced to collective
nostalgia for a mythical golden age. It has a real basis”.
30. Source: New Russia Barometer XIII, Fieldwork 18-23 March 2004, N=1602, in
www.russiavotes.org, downloaded 8 January 2005. The option “It is safe to go about the streets
without being afraid of crime” was, in addition, among the two most popular options, whereas fair
treatment from government officials was less frequently seen as needed for a “normal society”.
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society” at all or was so to only a limited extent. Whatever one thinks of the
value of such categories as a “normal society”, it is nonetheless interesting
that to earn money from a job and retain its value, purchase (build a co-
operative) or obtain a flat, and hope for a better future for oneself and one’s
children31 were something that was real for most of the respondents in the
Soviet era, but which now for most are crucially lacking. 
Against this background, the housing transition looks for many Russians
like a change that “can only be for the worse” (Struyk, 1996: 44). Although a
large ratio (about 70%) of flats has been privatized, the privatisers were often
not aware of the rights and obligations involved and did not consider the
financial implications of privatization (UNECE, 2004). Many people feared
rising rents and maintenance and utility costs, and were in general worried
about the uncertainty of the future (Struyk, 1996: 44). While the transition
has brought undeniable benefits, so that people have much to choose from in
terms of location, cost, size, amenities and neighbourhood (Lehmann, Ruble,
1997: 1086), the problem for most is that the shortage of flats has shifted into
a shortage of money (Vysokovskii, 2001b). For many, then, the benefits of
the transition may not have been very substantial compared to the risks.
Ownership of flats serves as a good example. According to surveys, most
tenants in the Soviet era perceived themselves as owners of their flats
(Vysokovskii, 2001a). While legally they did not own them, they actually
enjoyed rights of use that equalled or even exceeded in many ways those rights
that are conventionally associated with ownership in the West; for instance,
they had the right to pass their flat on by inheritance and were almost fully
protected against eviction (Marcuse, 1996). Since the beginning of March
2005, a new housing code has been introduced that states among other things
that “free” privatization will end by the year 2007 and eviction will be made
easier; on the other hand, the aim is also to make mortgage finance accessible
to a third of the population (Vihavainen, 2005). What the future will bring to
so-called ordinary people, how much will actually change and whether the
carrots outweigh the sticks in the forthcoming years remains to be seen. 
66
31. Our material is in dramatic contrast to Post-Soviet Estonia, for instance, where the
islanders of Saaremaa were fairly optimistic that their children, at least, had a brighter future
ahead (Assmuth, 2001). 
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